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| Segment 1 Return to index of stories... |
WEEK 1, PAGE 3, Segment 1 The Republican Primary In contrast to the Democrats' drama, the New Hampshire Republican primary was a quiet affair in 1968. In fact, by the time the two major GOP candidates began their campaigns in New Hampshire, the major events that were to determine the outcome had already occurred. CR Despite Richard Nixon's dramatic declaration in 1962, after losing the California gubernatorial election, that the press would no longer have him to kick around anymore because this was his last press conference, Nixon had never really left politics. CR In January, 1964, he made that clear. When asked on a CBS radio program whether he intended to run for president, he said: "I never wear a hat, so it must always be in the ring." CR Nixon maintained his political contacts, and in 1966 stumped vigorously around the country for his fellow Republicans. That year, the GOP gained 47 house seats, which enhanced Nixon's stature among party leaders. By 1967, he was widely considered the front-runner for his party's presidential nomination. CR The 1966 election was also a good one for George Romney, father of future candidate Mitt Romney, who easily won re-election for his third term as governor of Michigan. He had refrained from entering the presidential race in 1964, but with Goldwater's debacle and his own re-election, he was eager to launch his campaign for the nomination. Indeed, he was widely seen as the choice for the moderate wing of the Republic Party. Nevertheless, some supporters argued strenuously that he should not enter the New Hampshire Primary, but should wait to enter the Wisconsin Primary the following month. New Hampshire was seen as too conservative and too favorable toward Richard Nixon. CR Importantly, Bill Loeb, the outspoken publisher of the Manchester Union Leader, the only statewide newspaper, would use his paper to attack Romney in his relentless and vitriolic style. Wisconsin, a sister Midwestern state, would be a more favorable venue for the governor to begin his campaign. But Romney didn't listen. CR As it turns out, it may not have made much difference had he skipped the New Hampshire Primary as suggested. Five months before Election Day, on September 4, 1967, he had essentially torpedoed his own candidacy when he explained to a Detroit television newsman how he had come to oppose the Vietnam War. The newsman pointed out that after Romney's visit to Vietnam in 1965, the Michigan governor said that U.S. involvement there was "morally right and necessary and had probably reversed a shift in the balance of power greater than if Hitler had conquered Europe." CR Now, two years later, Romney was arguing that the war had been a mistake from the beginning. How could the governor explain this "inconsistency"? It was then that Romney uttered the fateful words: "When I came back from Viet Nam, I'd just had the greatest brainwashing that anybody can get." He clarified that he was speaking of both the generals and the diplomats. But since then, he said he had studied the history of the conflict and had thus changed his mind, no longer believing it was necessary to get involved in Vietnam to stop communist aggression. CR Despite how reasonable his arguments may seem today, at the time, his use of the word "brainwashing" recalled the concerns of many people about the effect that the Korean War may had exerted on the psyches of some American soldiers. The movie, The Manchurian Candidate, gave an artistic portrayal of a soldier who had lost control of his mental faculties and was now under the spell of a foreign agent. CR That a presidential candidate would suggest he had suffered such a loss of control over his own mind struck a discordant chord with the American political culture of the time. As one political scientist has since observed, "Though Romney tried in earnest to explain himself, he became the target of blistering press and partisan attacks. Romney's candidacy never recovered from the furor he created with his statement." The next Harris poll showed Romney dropping 16 points. CR Romney's campaign in New Hampshire never gained any real traction. With three weeks before the election, after having spent considerable time and resources in the state, Romney trailed Nixon by about 60 percentage points in the polls. With the advice of his campaign staff, the governor decided to quit the race, leaving Nixon with no major opponent. Nixon swept through New Hampshire without a hitch on his way to the Republican nomination, and eventually the presidency itself. |
| Segment 2 Return to index of stories... |
WEEK 1, PAGE 3, Segment 2 It took another crisis, the tumult of the Democratic Party's presidential nomination process in 1968, to wrench the system of selection into its current, primary-centered mode. After Lyndon Johnson ultimately decided not to seek a second term, Vice President Hubert Humphrey entered the race in his place, as did Senator Robert Kennedy of New York, who was assassinated after winning the California primary. CR Humphrey did not run in any contested primaries, relying instead on the power of party bosses to get him enough delegates to win the nomination. Humphrey accepted the nomination in Chicago, while outside the convention hall, police battled with demonstrators. CR The "New Politics" movement, a combination of the left wing of the Democratic Party and those active in the anti-Vietnam War movement, declared Humphrey's nomination illegitimate. Their main charge was that the Vice President with the aid of party bosses, like Chicago Mayor Richard Daley, had circumvented the will of the rank-and-file members of the by manipulating the rules to the advantage of their favored candidate. CR In response, the Democratic Party created a special commission, the Commission on Party Structure and Delegate Selection to rework the rules for delegate selection for the 1972 convention. CR The Commission did all it could to pull the teeth of the party bosses and render them powerless to decide the party's presidential nominee by insisting the party's convention delegates represent the diversity of the rank and file. The commission established a series of requirements for state parties to follow, if they wanted their delegates to be seated at the next quadrennial convention. CR Proxy voting was forbidden as was use of the unit rule also, the practice of automatically making the party elite ex officio delegates. CR All state parties were to establish written rules that would outline the delegate-selection process explicitly, and all delegates were to be selected in the same calendar year that the national convention was held. Party meetings were to be held at uniform times and on uniform dates, in easily accessible public places, and with public notice. CR The McGovern-Fraser Commission yanked the presidential nomination process out of the infamous smoke-filled rooms of the party bosses, and thrust it into the public spotlight, in an effort to make it as transparent and democratic as possible. As a result, the successful candidate for the nomination was now the one most successful in winning the support of the party activists and ordinary voters who participated in primaries and attended caucuses. CR This was true for the Republican Party as well as the Democrats, although the GOP displayed no particular enthusiasm for reform. Democrat-controlled state legislatures engineered changes in their states' primary laws that affected both major parties. For example, the number of Democratic primaries increased from 15 in 1968 to 34 in 1980; the number of Republican primaries showed an almost identical increase, from 15 to 35. CR As a rule, however, the Republicans have been much more reluctant than the Democrats to exert national control over their state parties. In addition, while the Democrats have been very concerned about ensuring proportional representation in the nomination process and providing for greater representation of the young, women and African Americans in the convention, the Republicans have shown little such interest. CR Around the same time, the Federal Election Campaign Act also brought significant change to campaigning in the early 1970s. In response to the scandals of Watergate, Congress passed a series of new laws meant to remove the corrupting influence of big money from the campaign system. CR For instance federal matching funds were offered to candidates who met certain minimum requirements as an attempt to level the playing field,. This legislation and various amendments imposed limits on the contributions of individuals and political action committees or PACs and spending for candidates who accepted government funding. CR All monies raised and spent by presidential candidates were to be accounted for and disclosed. Again, reformers equated a better, fairer political system with a more transparent, democratic system. The combined result of these two reforms, scholars now argue, worked in contrast to the intent of the reformers. The presidential nomination process has been lengthened considerably. And yet, much of this process takes place out of sight of the public, in the elite circles of party activists, wealthy donors, and media. |
| Segment 3 Return to index of stories... |
1972 - NH Envy CR With the Democratic Party's reforms taking effect in the 1972 election cycle, it would never again be possible for a non-incumbent presidential candidate to obtain the nomination without a vigorous campaign effort in the New Hampshire Primary. CR Incumbent presidents running for re-election typically do not face serious competition. Without a serious opponent, the incumbent presidents do not have to wage as intensive a campaign as they otherwise would. But for non-incumbent candidates, winning in New Hampshire - or at least coming in second - has been crucial to obtaining the nomination. CR When the reforms were first adopted, some candidates believed they could skip the New Hampshire Primary and launch their campaigns in other states where the environment might be more favorable. Thus, in 1972, and again in 1976, several potential Democratic candidates for president began their quests sometime after the New Hampshire Primary, only to discover that the publicity and money generated by a good showing in the Granite State had given their competitors an advantage they could not overcome. Even as late as 1988, Al Gore decided to make his first serious campaign effort in March on Super Southern Tuesday, three weeks after the New Hampshire Primary. But by then, it was too late to catch up with Michael Dukakis, the winner in New Hampshire. CR One net consequence of the reforms was to create a trend toward "front-loading" of the primaries and caucuses. States that waited until April or later often found they had little influence on the nomination, that a party's nomination had for all practical purposes been decided by the end of March. And candidates, too, recognized the importance of the early contests, that they needed to start their campaigns right at the beginning of the primary/caucus season rather than wait until later. CR In the immediate aftermath of the Democratic Party reforms adopted in 1971, many state party leaders across the country recognized the heightened importance of the first primary. While New Hampshire had been first, it had never had to fight for that position. But now it did. CR One state to take action was Nevada. Even before the McGovern-Fraser Commission had met to propose reforms, the Silver State's house and senate had passed a bill establishing its primary the same day as New Hampshire's. CR At the urging of the New Hampshire House Speaker, the Granite State's Governor Walter Peterson called Nevada Governor Paul Laxalt to ask him to veto the bill. According to Peterson, Laxalt apparently was sympathetic to the argument that New Hampshire intended to retain its premier position. If Nevada moved its primary up in the schedule, New Hampshire would simply move its primary a week earlier. Laxalt felt that in the end, the only result would be to create ill will with a sister state for no good reason. So, he vetoed the bill. CR Leaders in other states were not so accommodating. Prior to the 1972 election cycle, when the McGovern-Fraser reforms were to take effect, lawmakers in Rhode Island, Vermont, Alaska, and Florida contemplated scheduling their primaries to compete with New Hampshire's. Ultimately, legislators in Vermont and Rhode Island backed off, while the governor in Alaska vetoed a bill that would have brought presidential candidates and the media to Alaska in late February. Alaska Governor William Eagan wasn't as concerned with creating ill will with a sister state as was Laxalt, but he was skeptical that the publicity surrounding the campaign at that cold, dark time of the year would attract new industry and residents to his state. CR Florida, however, was a different case. The Sunshine State would be a glorious place for early campaigning, much warmer than New England, making it more attractive both for the candidates and for the journalists who were covering the campaigns. Indeed, Florida legislators asked, "Where do you think presidential candidates would rather be in December, January and February?" The legislators believed they could "steal the limelight from a small cold-climate state." CR Florida also had other more substantive attractions: It was a larger state, with many more delegates at stake. And it had a more diverse population than New Hampshire, and thus, arguably, would serve as a better microcosm of the national electorate. Moreover, the state legislature and the governor were in agreement. They enacted a law scheduling the Florida Primary for the second Tuesday in March, the same day as New Hampshire's Town Meeting Day and Presidential Primary. CR Political leaders in New Hampshire, however, were ready for the challenge. Once the Florida law was passed, the state legislature moved Town Meeting Day up a full week, to the first Tuesday in March, bringing with it the new date of the New Hampshire Primary. It was too late in the legislative process for Florida to react. There was also consideration in New Hampshire to move its primary ahead of the Iowa Caucuses, which the Democrats in that state had scheduled for January. But the prevailing view among the Granite State leaders was to insist only on holding the first primary, not necessarily to hold the first nomination contest. "The state would be in a stronger position later if it protected what it had - nothing less but nothing more." Besides caucuses were different and had never received much publicity anyway. So, it was unlikely the Iowa contest would pose much of a threat to New Hampshire's premier position. |
| Segment 5 Return to index of stories... |
WEEK 1, PAGE 3, Segment 4 1976 REPUBLICAN PRIMARY Welcome back. Let's start our discussion of the 1976 New Hampshire primaries with a rule of thumb: When an incumbent president is challenged for his own party's nomination, that incumbent is unusually weak. That was the predicament of President Gerald Ford. CR In 1976, Ford was an unelected president. He had been appointed to the vice presidency after Richard Nixon's Vice President, Spiro Agnew, resigned over bribery charges. Then, Ford became president after Nixon resigned over the scandals known as Watergate. CR Ford was widely criticized for granting a pardon to Nixon just one month after the president resigned. In general, Ford was portrayed in the press, as a "well-intentioned bumbler," "a nice guy who was in over his head." CR Still, it seemed highly unlikely that the GOP would refuse to re-nominate its own incumbent president, especially by replacing him with the former Governor of California, Ronald Reagan, a man who closely identified with the right wing of his party - the same right wing that had put forward Barry Goldwater a decade earlier, only to lose in a landslide to Lyndon Johnson in 1964. CR Yet, two Gallup polls suggested Reagan had a chance. In October, before Reagan's announcement, a national poll of Republicans showed Ford leading Reagan by 23 percentage points but a poll in November, following his announcement, showed Reagan leading by 8 points - an astonishing 31-point swing in the margin between the two candidates in just one month. Suddenly, the Reagan challenge was seen as real. CR New Hampshire would be crucial for both candidates. If Ford lost here, it would reinforce the view that as an unelected president, he was not really legitimate, and that voters, if given the choice, would select someone else. Ford's own advisors felt that if the president lost in New Hampshire, his campaign could quickly crumble. CR The flip side of the coin was that for Reagan, the early primary was a test of whether his claim that Ford was not a bona fide incumbent would be validated. An early Ford win would nullify that argument, which could lead to other Ford victories and doom Reagan's candidacy. CR For years in his speeches and columns, Reagan had been denouncing "big government," especially the Federal Government in Washington, a theme that was now at the center of his candidacy for president. CR One of the suggestions he made in a 1975 speech in Chicago was that the federal budget could be reduced by $90 billion if certain social programs were transferred to the states. It was a massive cut in the budget and meant that states would either have to cut programs or raise taxes, or both. CR At the time he gave the speech, Reagan had not yet declared his candidacy, and the implications of his proposal were largely ignored in the press. But after his announced decision to run for president, the Ford campaign got hold of the speech and blasted Reagan for the proposal just as the former governor landed in New Hampshire for his first foray into the state. CR The press latched on to the issue, pointing out that 62 percent of the welfare programs in New Hampshire were federally-funded. Wouldn't that mean the state would have to increase its property taxes, or institute an income or sales tax, or cut the programs? This was an especially sensitive issue in New Hampshire, since it had no statewide sales tax or general income tax. The $90 billion proposal was an albatross that never went away. CR In the last week of the campaign, a poll by his pollster, Richard Wirthlin, showed Reagan leading Ford by 11 percentage points. Former New Hampshire governor Hugh Gregg, Reagan's state chairman, had always wanted to lower expectations, saying that if Reagan were to get even 40 percent of the vote against an incumbent president, that should be considered a victory. CR But the Reagan campaign was clearly excited about winning the approaching election, and - in their exuberance, ignored Gregg's advice. New Hampshire Governor Meldrim Thomson told the press Reagan would get at least 55 percent of the vote. To compound the problem of setting expectations, Reagan himself left the state before Election Day, confident that he would emerge the victor. CR In 1976, none of the major media organizations had yet developed their own polling organizations, and thus had to depend on whatever polling information the campaigns would share. Dr. George Gallup refused to poll in primary states, believing they were too fluid to make accurate readings. His polls were of national samples, either of Democrats, or Republicans, or the electorate more generally. CR However, in late February, a University of New Hampshire poll published showed Ford leading Reagan by a couple of percentage points, within the poll's margin of error, but suggesting the race was a toss-up, not the clear Reagan victory that the press expected. CR That poll, however, had little impact on the expectations of the news media or on the expectations of Reagan's own campaign staff. When Reagan lost the primary by 1.5 percentage points, it was too late to claim a "moral victory," as McGovern had done in 1972 and McCarthy in 1968 - both of whom lost, but did better than expected against the presumed front-runners. CR In 1976, Reagan was expected to win, and he lost. The victory was a major boost for Ford, who went on to win in Florida two weeks later, the momentum from New Hampshire an important factor in that victory. Reagan was a strong enough candidate to battle Ford for the nomination to the convention itself. But if Ford had lost New Hampshire, it's likely the country would have seen a Carter/Reagan contest four years earlier than it actually did. |
| Segment 4 Return to index of stories... |
1972 - The Reforms Take Place CR Who better to take advantage of the new reforms than the man who had chaired the committee that designed them? More than anyone, South Dakota Senator George McGovern knew that the reforms had shifted the power of nomination - from the party's national convention in the summer before the election, to the caucuses and primaries that would now select the delegates. With the new reforms, party bosses could no longer appoint delegates to the convention or rig elections to favor some delegates over others. Instead, convention delegates would be chosen by voters in open elections, either in a caucus or primary election format. CR The clear Democratic favorite that year was Maine Senator Edmund Muskie, mostly because of the name recognition he got from being the vice presidential nominee in 1968, running with then Vice President Hubert Humphrey. Muskie enjoyed all the advantages of a front runner: the blessing of the party bosses, as well as heavy press coverage. And in New Hampshire, he was literally the boy next door, born in the mill town of Rumford, near the border of the Granite State. CR A Gallup poll in January 1972 among Democrats nationally showed Muskie with 32 percent support, compared with just 3 percent for McGovern. Thus, as far as the press was concerned, McGovern was not a serious contender. This perception was a boon to the senator's campaign, for it meant that any significant showing in the early contests contradicting that perception would cause the press to take notice. CR McGovern announced his candidacy in January, 1971, more than a year before the first nomination contests, the earliest that any major candidate had ever announced. CR Not surprisingly, McGovern does not attribute his better-than-expected showing to Muskie's "crying" incident. His success, he said, was due more to his more extensive campaign efforts, and to being "bettered positioned on the issues that moved the voters: jobs, tax reform, the war, openness in government and political reform." It's hard to believe that Muskie was against jobs, tax reform, openness in government and political reform; and Muskie was clearly opposed to the war at that point. But while Muskie had said he would end the war in Vietnam, it was McGovern who declared the war a moral and political disaster, and a cancer consuming the nation's soul. So, the issues were probably of less influence than McGovern suggests. SMITH AND SCALA DEBATE VIGOROUSLY HERE. CR Whatever the reasons for his good showing, McGovern was clearly the "winner," despite receiving fewer votes than Muskie. He did much better than the press expected, establishing himself as a formidable challenger to Muskie and other Democrats who would later enter the race, and significantly helping his fundraising efforts. The results clearly hurt Muskie's candidacy, but for both candidates, the New Hampshire Primary was merely one contest with many more to follow. In no sense can that primary be seen as decisive for either candidate. In the broader picture, however, it seems clear that McGovern would not have been the party's nominee had the old convention system of nominating candidates still been in place. The reforms led to a more democratic process, but produced a candidate who was almost certainly not the strongest the party could offer against Nixon in the general election. |
| Segment 6 Return to index of stories... |
WEEK 1, PAGE 2, Segment 6 1968 New Hampshire Primary CR Welcome back. We're up to 1968, a tumultuous year in American politics - thanks in part to the voters of New Hampshire, who took it upon themselves to "send a message" to the powers that be. And once again an incumbent president chose to ignore the New Hampshire Primary and suffered the price CR The Democratic Primary Months before the 1968 presidential election season officially began, political observers widely assumed that President Lyndon Johnson intended to run for re-election. This seemed to be a safe assumption even though Johnson refused to campaign for his party's nomination. CR Remember, at the time the conventional wisdom was that it was beneath the dignity of a sitting president to have to RUN for the nomination of his party. After all, he was the party's leader! Johnson would gain the nomination in the traditional way, not by entering primaries and caucuses, but by relying on state party leaders and their delegates to support him at the national convention in late summer. CR But Johnson presided over a party divided. The country itself was torn apart by disagreement over the Vietnam War, which drained the country's resources, diverted Johnson's attention from the domestic goals of the Great Society, and produced large numbers of war casualties every week. Frequent anti-war demonstrations made Johnson something like a prisoner in the White House. Had he tried to campaign in New Hampshire and other states, his appearances would have been dominated by the war issue. It was much easier for Johnson simply to wait until the Democratic National Convention in the summer to obtain the party's nomination. CR Still, the president had to decide whether to officially announce his candidacy and put his name on the ballot, or follow another course of action. If Johnson didn't officially declare his intentions to seek re-election, he could have New Hampshire's Senator Tom McIntyre run as a stand-in, with McIntyre's public declaration that he was a Johnson supporter; or the president could have his supporters launch a write-in campaign. Either of these two alternatives would not be as strong as having the president's name actually on the ballot. In the end, Johnson opted for what turned out to be a losing strategy: Not declaring his candidacy, but allowing a write-in campaign on his behalf. CR In the meantime, there emerged a national "Dump Johnson" movement, led by two liberal activists, Allard Lowenstein and Curtis Gans. Lowenstein wanted Robert Kennedy to run. Several things made Bobby Kennedy a natural choice: He was the former U.S. Attorney General, appointed by his brother President Kennedy, and currently a U.S. Senator from New York. He had already expressed doubts about the war, even proposing in May of 1967 a three-point plan to bring it to an end. CR But Kennedy refused to run. He felt his direct challenge to Johnson's re-election could divide the party and would almost certainly have been viewed as much a personal issue as a policy one, given their long-standing animosity. Besides, Kennedy could afford to wait - he was only 42 and could run four years later, without committing the almost unpardonable sin of challenging an incumbent president of one's own party. CR Eventually, Lowenstein and Gans persuaded Minnesota Senator Eugene McCarthy to run against Johnson. McCarthy, at first glance, seemed a poor substitute for Kennedy, and a most unlikely rallying point: one potential supporter described him as "a gray, tired, old college professor." But while McCarthy might have suffered from a charisma deficit, he became the face of a campaign designed to "send a message." CR Initially, McCarthy was reluctant to run in New Hampshire, which he perceived as too conservative and hawkish on the war. And, in mid-November, before McCarthy announced his candidacy, the state Democratic Party officially endorsed Johnson for re-election. The endorsement meant little, since there was no "party machine" available to help the president's campaign. CR But McCarthy's supporters convinced the candidate that it was precisely because of New Hampshire's reputation as a conservative state that he should enter the fray in an attempt to exceed expectations. And in addition, a McCarthy challenge to Johnson in New Hampshire would mean months of free publicity that could aid the insurgent campaign across the country. CR After visiting the state in December, McCarthy finally agreed to make a run. He officially announced his candidacy in January, and soon thereafter, anti-war activists began coming to New Hampshire to help the McCarthy campaign. They were advised by supporters to "Get Clean for Gene" - which meant to cut their hair and look like "normal" people, rather than like the public stereotypes of n'er-do-well hippies. Many of McCarthy's young campaign workers would stay in New Hampshire after the primary and often re-appear in future primary campaigns. CR Then at the end of January, the North Vietnamese launched the Tet offensive, a massive attack in cities across South Vietnam, which undermined the claims by the Johnson administration that predicted a near end to the war. CR In February, thousands of anti-war activists, mostly students, poured into New Hampshire to help the McCarthy campaign. The ultimate coup, however, may have been a story that leaked over the final weekend before primary Day. The story reported that Westmoreland had requested 200,000 more troops to fight the war. CR On March 12, 1968, it was Lyndon Johnson who "won" the New Hampshire Democratic primary with just under 50 percent - a fairly impressive performance, given that voters for Johnson had to write in his name. CR But it was McCarthy who shocked the world of American politics by carrying 42 percent of New Hampshire voters - hitting a mark above the 40 percent threshold that Johnson's campaign team had said would be necessary for McCarthy to avoid "disgrace." CR And while Johnson narrowly defeated McCarthy in the "Beauty Contest." He actually lost in the tally for delegates by a wide 20-4 margin. Remember, delegates were still voted for separately and McCarthy's team worked especially hard on getting their delegates elected. CR Four days later, Bobby Kennedy announced that McCarthy's victory had demonstrated that the Democratic Party was indeed split. He explained his late entry: "One of the major reasons I didn't want to become involved earlier was because I thought that I might be the instrument of dividing either the country in a way that would be difficult to put back together dividing the Democratic Party in a very damaging way." Now that McCarthy had shown how vulnerable Johnson was, and how divided the party was, Kennedy could, in good conscience, challenge the incumbent president. That was Johnson's greatest fear, and something he had long expected. CR The "Dump Johnson" movement met its goal much more quickly than anyone could have imagined. With Kennedy in the race, Johnson announced on March 31, 1968, that he was not a candidate for re-election and would not serve another term. Johnson's "defeat" in New Hampshire spelled the beginning of the end for his presidency. |